General Concepts
Mind-Body Problem.
The concern of understanding the relation between the mind and body or, more so, the seemingly causal relation between mental and physical properties.
Metaphysics.
The science of being; the study of the ultimate reasons as to why things are the way they are; the study of those things which lie ‘beyond physics’ or ‘beyond the senses,'.
The -isms
Dualism
In general, the belief that there are but two substances, entities, or principles which are independent and mutually irreducible, such as, mind and body and where mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical in nature.
Materialism (Physicalism)
The view that emphasizes the priority of matter as the chief or only substance in reality.
Idealism (Immaterialism)
In general, refers to the view that reality consists mainly, or only, of ideas, spirit, mind or thought.
Realism
The view that physical states can give rise to mental states, but mental states cannot affect physical states.
Epiphenomenalism
The view that tends to hold that objects have an existence independent of the mind, or sense objects independent of the sense.
Panpsychism
The view that mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world.
Reductionism
With regards to philosophy, the view that all parts of the world, including our own experiences, can be reduced back or down to one singular thing.
Mysterianism
The belief that the question of consciousness is unsolvable by human minds.
Pragmatism- William James
Method for settling metaphysical disputes that might otherwise be interminable; a philosophical tradition that – very broadly – understands knowing the world as inseparable from agency within it.

Works Cited.
Hakim, A. (2001). Historical introduction to philosophy. Prentice Hall. retrieval date 28 April 2020.
Mastin, L. (2009, January). Existence and Consciousness. Retrieved [Month, day, year], from https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_metaphysics.html. retrieval date 28 April 2020.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/index.html. retrieval date 28 April 2020